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ABSTRACT
A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous
agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibil-
ity to individual agents and groups of agents. When designing
a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups
of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of
affairs. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish
to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for
a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to
bringing about that state of affairs. In this paper, we discuss several
aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their
epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the
system behavior. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning
about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in
terms of the agents’ strategies and epistemic properties, and state
some properties of the framework.
KEYWORDS
Responsibility in Agent Systems; Strategic Reasoning; Concurrent
Game Structures; Temporal and Modal Logic.
ACM Reference Format:
Vahid Yazdanpanah, Mehdi Dastani, Wojciech Jamroga, Natasha Alechina,
and Brian Logan. 2019. Strategic Responsibility Under Imperfect Information.
In Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), Montreal, Canada, May 13–17, 2019,
IFAAMAS, 9 pages.
1 INTRODUCTION
A central concept in the specification and verification of autonomous
systems andmultiagent systems is the notion of responsibility. From
a design perspective, ascribing responsibility to individual agents
and groups of agent can guide the allocation of necessary and suf-
ficient capabilities and resources to agents. This forward looking
perspective is particularly useful for determining whether the as-
signment of responsibilities to agents and groups of agents by a
multiagent organization is consistent with the agents’ capabilities
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
and resources. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system we
may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of
agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each
agent to bringing about that state of affairs. This backward looking
perspective is useful in determining which agents or groups of
agents are responsible or even to blame for an undesirable state of
affairs.
The concept of responsibility has been studied in philosophical
literature (e.g., [7, 32]), where responsibility is analyzed in terms
of, e.g., agents’ abilities, knowledge, and intentions, and classified
along different dimensions such as group vs. individual responsi-
bility, forward vs. backward responsibility, and action-oriented vs.
state-oriented responsibility. To capture such notions, recent contri-
butions in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems have pro-
posed reasoning frameworks, operational semantics, and decision
support tools. For example, [8] focuses on the strategic dimension
of responsibility, and defines notions for reasoning about responsi-
bility with respect to agents’ coalitional abilities; [11] focuses on
the normative aspect, and argues that autonomous systems require
value-aware methods to ensure that their behavior is aligned with
social preferences; [5] focuses on the problem of autonomous ve-
hicles, and shows that ensuring the security of autonomous agent
systems may result in social dilemmas; and [26] focuses on the
interrelation between group and individual responsibility, and high-
lights the complexities involved in responsibility-sharing among
agents in collective decision-making scenarios.
In a multiagent setting, reasoning about (degrees of) responsi-
bility for a (desirable or undesirable) state of affairs involves deter-
mining if (to what extent) a group of agents is or was (physically
and epistemically) able to use its strategic power to influence (i.e.,
to ensure, avoid, or control) the occurrence of the state of affairs.
Reasoning about responsibility may take place either before the
occurrence of a situation (prospectively) or after it (retrospectively).
The prospective form is known as forward (looking) responsibility
and the retrospective one is called backward (looking) responsibility
[30]. Forward responsibility is relevant when planning in multia-
gent systems—e.g., to ensure fault tolerance or to guarantee the
feasibility of a task allocation profile. Backward responsibility is is
relevant when analyzing system behavior, and can be a justification
for ascribing liability in legal systems and (in a more general sense)
for sanction allocation in normative multiagent systems.
We deem a group of agents responsible for a situation if the
group is or was able to avoid the situation using the strategies
available to it. The distinction between a group that is able and
one that was able underlies the distinction between forward and
backward responsibility. Moreover, any analysis of responsibility
of agents must take into account their epistemic uncertainty, as
the ability of the agents to execute a strategy depends on their
knowledge of the environment.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to modeling and
reasoning about the responsibility of groups of agents in an imper-
fect information setting. Our approach uses Concurrent Epistemic
Game Structures (CEGS) [1] as the underlying semantic machinery.
CEGS allow us to integrate the strategic and epistemic dimensions
of responsibility which is a fundamental requirement for ascribing
responsibility [7] to agents. We show how our approach can be used
to model and analyze various issues and dimensions related to re-
sponsibility, including the relation between forward and backward
responsibility and the analysis of responsibility under imperfect
information.
Our analysis of responsibility is compatible with the causal anal-
ysis proposed in [10], where responsibility is defined in terms the
role of an agent (or group of agents) in bringing about a state of
affairs. However, while most causal frameworks for modeling re-
sponsibility (e.g., in [10]) do not include an explicit notion of time,
our notion of responsibility is explicitly temporal in being defined
using ATL.
2 ANALYSIS AND FORMAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the intuition behind our work using a
running example and recall key notions from concurrent epistemic
game structures that form the basis of our formal framework.
2.1 Conceptual Analysis
Imagine a scenario in which the leaders of four communities, N , E,
W , and S , are invited to meet the KingK . Leaders N and E have pills
containing 1 and 3 grams of poison p, respectively; whileW and S
have pills containing 3 and 5 grams of theriacal t . 4 grams of either
p or t is sufficient to kill a person, and one gram of t neutralizes the
toxic effects of one gram of p (and vice versa). The effects of p and
t , and their possession of the pills is common knowledge among
the four community leaders. In the meeting with K , first N and
E (independently) and thenW and S (again independently) have
access to K ’s cup of wine. After the meeting, the king’s chamber-
lain discovers K dead, and, after investigating, learns that all the
community leaders dropped their pills into K ’s cup of wine. The
question is: “who is responsible for K ’s death and to what extent?” It
is clear that none of the leaders acting individually has a strategy
to either ensure the death of K or to avoid it. Moreover, they were
each unaware of the others’ actions (i.e., they were all acting un-
der epistemic uncertainty). Hence, the responsibility for K ’s death
should be distributed among N , E,W , and S , albeit in a reasonable
manner.
We argue that the ascription of responsibility in multiagent
settings should take into account the strategic, temporal, normative,
and epistemic aspects of the notion of responsibility. That is, to
ascribe responsibility for a state of affairs 𝒮 (intuitively, the set
of states satisfying some ‘bad’ property φ, such as violations of
a norm) to a group of agents A, A must both be strategically and
epistemically able to avoid 𝒮 at a moment of time prior to the
occurrence of 𝒮 . In other words, we say:
a group A is responsible for a state of affairs 𝒮 iff 𝒮
occurs and A was able (had a strategy) to preclude it
given their knowledge.
The first step in ascribing responsibility is to identify those
groups of agents that have a strategy to avoid the death of K . For
example, whenW and S have an opportunity to put their theriacal
t in K ’s wine, ifW drops his 3 gram pill in the wine and S does
not drop his 5 gram pill, they can avoid the death of K . They are
therefore a responsible group. In contrast, the group NW is not
responsible due to its lack of knowledge, and hence strategic ability,
as NW ’s strategy to avoid K ’s death depends on knowing how E
and S acted or will act. This is, only if it is known to them that
E drops his pill in the wine, can NW avoid the death of K by not
dropping their pills in the wine, as this strategy neutralizes the
effects of any potential act of S . Note that E’s 3 grams of p either
remains non-lethal (if S does nothing) or mixes with 5 grams of t
and leads to 2 non-lethal grams of t in the wine (if S drops his pill
in the wine).
We further require that a responsible group contains no “excess”
individuals, that is, agents whose presence/absence does not affect
the preclusive ability of the group. For example, removing agent N
from the the group NWS , results in the groupWS which still has
preclusive power with respect to king’s death. Below, we present a
formalization of the example and give a list of responsible groups.
In summary, to assign responsibility for a state of affairs 𝒮 to a
group of agents A, the following three conditions are necessary:
(1) 𝒮-relevant history: the history, i.e., a sequence of states h
ending in a state in 𝒮 ;
(2) A’s ability to preclude 𝒮 : that A had the potential to avoid 𝒮
in some state on h;1
(3) Minimality of A: there is no subgroup B ⊂ A that was able to
preclude 𝒮 in any state on h.
In subsequent sections, we provide a formal account of these con-
ditions and characterize our notion of responsibility in multiagent
systems. We then show how standard game theoretic methods can
be applied to distribute responsibility among members of a group
according to their contribution. In the remainder of this section, we
recall the formal machinery that forms the basis of our framework.
2.2 Concurrent Epistemic Game Structures
To model agent systems and analyze their strategic behavior under
imperfect information, we useConcurrent Epistemic Game Structures
(CEGS) [1] as an epistemic extension of Concurrent Game Structures
(CGS) [3].
Concurrent Epistemic Game Structures: Formally, a concurrent
epistemic game structure (CEGS) is a tuple ℳ = ∐︀Σ,Q,Act ,∼1
, . . . ,∼n ,d,õ︀ where: Σ = {a1, . . . ,an} is a finite, non-empty set
1Note that here, ability to preclude captures both the strategic ability of a group and
their epistemic uncertainty.
of agents; Q is a finite, non-empty set of states; Act is a finite set
of atomic actions; ∼a⊆ Q × Q is an epistemic indistinguishability
relation for each agent a ∈ Σ (we assume that ∼a is an equivalence
relation, where q ∼a q′ indicates that states q and q′ are indistin-
guishable to a); function d ∶ Σ ×Q ↦ 𝒫(Act) specifies the sets of
actions available to agents at each state (we require that the same
actions be available to an agent in indistinguishable states, i.e.,
d(a,q) = d(a,q′) whenever q ∼a q′); and o is a deterministic tran-
sition function that assigns the outcome state q′ = o(q,α1, . . . ,αn)
to state q and a tuple of actions αi ∈ d(i,q) that can be executed by
Σ in q.
To represent and and reason about strategies and outcomes in
agent systems with imperfect information we make use of the
following auxiliary notions. (References to elements ofℳ are to
elements of a CEGSℳ modeling a given multiagent system, e.g.,
we write Q instead of Q inℳ.)
Successors and Computations: For two states q and q′, we say q′
is a successor of q if there exist actions αi ∈ d(i,q) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
in q such that q′ = o(q,α1, . . . ,αn), i.e., agents in Σ can collectively
guarantee in q that q′ will be the next system state. A computa-
tion of a CEGSℳ is an infinite sequence of states λ = q0,q1, . . .
such that, for all i > 0, we have that qi is a successor of qi−1.
We refer to a computation that starts in q as a q-computation. For
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, we denote the i’th state in λ by λ(︀i⌋︀, and λ(︀0, i⌋︀ and
λ(︀i,∞⌋︀ respectively denote the finite prefix q0, . . . ,qi and infinite
suffix qi ,qi+1, . . . of λ. We refer to any two arbitrary states qi and
qi+1 as two consecutive states in λ(︀i,∞⌋︀. Finally, we say a finite
sequence of states q0, . . . ,qn is a q-history if qn = q, n ≥ 1, and for
all 0 ≤ i < n we have that qi+1 is a successor of qi . We denote a
q-history that starts in qi and has n steps with λ(︀qi ,n⌋︀.
Strategies and Outcomes: A memoryless imperfect information
strategy2 for an agent a ∈ Σ is a function ζa ∶ Q ↦ Act such that, for
all q ∈ Q : (1) ζa(q) ∈ d(q,a), and (2) q ∼a q′ implies ζa(q) = ζa(q′).
For a group of agents Γ ⊆ Σ, a collective strategy ZΓ = {ζa ⋃︀ a ∈ Γ}
is an indexed set of strategies, one for every a ∈ Γ. Then, out(q,ZΓ)
is defined as the set of potential q-computations that agents in Γ
can enforce by following their corresponding strategies in ZΓ . We
extend the notion to sets of states ω ⊆ Q in the straightforward
way: out(ω,ZΓ) = ⋃q′∈ω out(q′,ZΓ).
Uniform Strategies: A uniform strategy is one in which agents
select the same actions in all states where they have the same infor-
mation available to them. In particular, if agent a ∈ Σ is uncertain
whether the current state is q or q′, then a should select the same
action in q and in q′. A strategy ζa for agent a ∈ Σ is called uniform
if for any pair of states q, q′ such that q ∼a q′, ζa(q) = ζa(q′). A
strategy ZΓ is uniform if it is uniform for every a ∈ Γ ⊆ Σ. Realistic
modeling of strategic ability under imperfect information requires
restricting attention to uniform strategies only.
3 MODELING RESPONSIBILITY
Reasoning about responsibility may take place either before the
occurrence of a situation (prospectively) or after it (retrospectively).
2We focus on memoryless strategies in the imperfect information setting and avoid
other forms of strategy that assume the ability of agents to recall the evolution of the
multiagent system, e.g., perfect recall strategies (see [9]).
The prospective form is known as forward (looking) responsibility
and the retrospective one is called backward (looking) responsibility.
Forward responsibility is relevant when planning in multiagent
systems—e.g., to ensure fault tolerance or to guarantee the feasibil-
ity of a task allocation profile. Backward responsibility is is relevant
when analyzing system behavior, and can be a justification for as-
cribing liability in legal systems and (in a more general sense) for
sanction allocation in normative multiagent systems.
3.1 Forward Responsibility
The notion of forward responsibility—in the sense of [30]—has
been formalized in organizational settings [20] and under perfect
information [36]. Here we give a definition in our framework:
Definition 3.1 (Forward Group Responsibility). Letℳ be a CEGS,𝒮 ⊆ Q be a set of states, 𝒮 = Q ∖ 𝒮 , and q ∈ Q be a state. We say
that Γ ⊆ Σ is forward responsible for 𝒮 in q iff:
(1) there is a uniform strategy for Γ, ZΓ , such that for all states
on all computations in out(q,ZΓ) belong to 𝒮 , and
(2) Γ is minimal, that is, there is no Γ′ ⊂ Γ with the property
formulated in clause (1).
3.2 Backward Responsibility
In this section we give a definition of backward responsibility in
our framework. A group of agentsA is backward responsible for the
occurrence of a state of affairs 𝒮 in a given history, if A was able to
prevent the occurrence of 𝒮 somewhere in the history. This is, we
(1) reason about agent groups with preclusive power (in the sense
of [25]) over a state of affairs and (2) reason in a backward-looking
manner through the history (in the sense of [30]). We also take
the agents’ epistemic limitations into account by considering only
uniform strategies.
Let 𝒮 be a state of affairs in a multiagent system represented by
CEGSℳ. If the system is currently in a state q ∈ 𝒮 and within the
available q-history q0, . . . ,qk , there exists a state qi (i < k) from
which coalition Γ ⊆ Σ has a uniform strategy to avoid 𝒮 , we say
that it has backward-looking responsibility for 𝒮 . This is because
the occurrence of 𝒮 counterfactually depends on Γ’s choice.3
Definition 3.2 (Backward Group Responsibility). Letℳ be a CEGS,𝒮 be a set of states, q ∈ 𝒮 a state, and λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ an arbitrary q-history.
We say that Γ ⊆ Σ is backward responsible for 𝒮 based on λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ iff:
(1) there is a state qj in λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ such that for some uniform strat-
egy for Γ, ZΓ , all states on all computations in out(qj ,ZΓ)
belong to 𝒮 , and
(2) Γ is minimal, that is, there is no Γ′ ⊂ Γ with the property
formulated in clause (1).
In the sequel, we use R𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ to denote the set of all backward
responsible groups for 𝒮 based on the q-history λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀.
The following theorem links our two notions of backward and
forward responsibility.
3This approach in modeling power-based responsibility based on counterfactual depen-
dence is related to causality-based models presented in [10]. We discuss causality-based
models in Section 6.
Theorem 3.3 (Eqivalence of the two notions of responsi-
bility). Γ ⊆ Σ is backward responsible for 𝒮 based on λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ if and
only if in one of the states on λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, Γ is forward responsible for 𝒮 .
Example 3.4 (Responsible Groups for K ’s Death). Our running
example can be modeled asℳ = ∐︀Σ,Q,Act ,∼N ,∼E ,∼W ,∼S ,d,õ︀
where: Σ = {N ,E,W ,S};4 Q = {q0, . . . ,q6}; Act = {0, 1, 3, 5}
where 0 represents not-releasing a pill and other non-zero inte-
gers (denoting the weight of the pill) represent releasing a pill;
d(N ,q0) = {0, 1}, d(E,q0) = {0, 3}, d(W ,q0) = d(S,q0) = {0},
and for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}: d(N ,qi) = d(E,qi) = {0}, d(W ,qi) = {0, 3},
d(S,qi) = {0, 5}; transition function o is as illustrated in Figure 1.
E.g., in q0, action profile ∐︀1, 3, 0, 0̃︀ (respectively for ∐︀N ,E,W ,S̃︀)
results in state q4. Moreover, we represent the indistinguishability
relations by dashed lines, e.g., states q1 and q2 are indistinguishable
for N ,W , and S .
Given the q-history h = q0,q4,q6, we can use our notion of
backward responsibility to reason about the groups responsible for𝒮 = {q6} where the undesired property φ = “K is dead” holds. In h
all agents dropped their pills in the wine (i.e., we are in q6). In q4,
the only group with a uniform strategy to avoid q6 isWS . This is
becauseWS can guarantee that drinking the wine will not be fatal
by playing ∐︀3, 0̃︀. In q0, NS , ES , and NEW are all able to avoid K ’s
death. In the groups NS and ES , the agents should not drop their
pills in the wine (i.e., N and E in q0 and S in q4 and all the states
that he cannot distinguish from q4). In the group NEW , agents N
andW should not put their pills in the wine while E should. In total,
the four groups NS , ES ,WS , and NEW are responsible for 𝒮 under
the given history, as they had the strategic ability to avoid 𝒮 .
We can also ask the question: “to what extent should each agent
be held individually responsible for 𝒮?" One possible answer is that
“they are equally responsible as they are all members of a responsible
group." But it is notable that they possess pills that contain different
amounts of p and t . This results in a power imbalance among the
agents which we argue should be reflected in their “individual”
responsibility. We address these concerns—all referring to the so
called responsibility gap [23]5—in Section 4.
4 DISTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY
Using our notion of responsibility, we can determine which groups
of agents are responsible for a state of affairs, given a history. How-
ever, to solve the problem of many hands6, we require a method for
ascribing responsibility to individual agents. For instance, in the
running example (given the history q0,q4,q6), we have that NS , ES ,
WS , and NEW are responsible groups. But, to what extent each com-
munity leader is responsible? We argue that a reasonable approach
to distributing responsibility is to ascribe responsibility to agents
based on their marginal contributions to responsible groups. If
strategic power is not uniformly distributed among agents, sharing
the responsibility equally does not reflect the contribution of each
4Note that in our example, K is not an agent capable of performing actions within the
multiagent system, but merely a part of the environment.
5Briefly, a responsibility gap occurs when one can ascribe responsibility at the group
level but not at the level of individuals.
6Basically, this problem refers to situations where a group’s collective action resulted
in an outcome and realizing the contribution of individuals is not straightforward. See
[31] for a comprehensive account of this problem.
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Figure 1: In q0, agents N and E have an opportunity to drop
(represented by the weight of their pill) or not drop (repre-
sented by 0) their pills in K ’s wine. As a result, when agents
W and S have an opportunity to drop their pills, we either
have a fatal glass of wine in q4 or a non-fatal one in q1,
q2, and q3. Following the leaders’ actions, K drinks and ei-
ther survives in q5 or is fatally poisoned in q6. Dashed lines
denote the indistinguishability relations, states in which
drinking the wine is fatal are colored red, and the path out-
lined in blue denotes the history. To simplify the figure, we
also group some action profiles and represent them as a set,
e.g., in state q4, the execution of either of the action profiles∐︀0, 0, 0, 0̃︀ or ∐︀0, 0, 3, 5̃︀ denoted by γ results in state q6, while
all other action profiles denoted by γ¯ lead to q5.
agent. A standard approach to distributing values among agents
with respect to their contribution, is the Shapley-value [29]. Simply
stated, using the Shapley value, one can calculate the average value
that the presence of an agent brings to groups that it contributes
to. Here, we propose a Shapley-based method for distributing re-
sponsibility (for a state of affairs) among agents in a multiagent
system.
Definition 4.1 (Responsibility Value). Letℳ be a CEGS, 𝒮 a state
of affairs,q ∈ 𝒮 a state, and λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ an arbitraryq-history.We define
the responsibility game 𝒢𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = (Σ,ϱ) as a cooperative game
where for any coalition Γ ⊆ Σ, the game’s characteristic function
ϱ(Γ) = 1 iff a coalition Γ′ ⊆ Γ is q-responsible for 𝒮 given λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀;
otherwise ϱ(Γ) = 0. The q-responsibility value of agent a ∈ Σ for 𝒮
given λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, denoted ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, is:
ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = ∑
Γ⊆Σ∖{a}
⋃︀Γ⋃︀!(⋃︀Σ⋃︀ − ⋃︀Γ⋃︀ − 1)!⋃︀Σ⋃︀! (ϱ(Γ ∪ {a}) − ϱ(Γ)).
We show below how the properties that characterize the Shapley
value and the Shapley-based notion of fairness in economics [27, 29]
are reflected in reasoning about responsibility value of (individual)
agents. In principle, fairness in value distribution—in a cooperative
game among a group of agents—is axiomatized by the satisfaction
of: (1) Efficiency, that the summation of distributed values is equal
to the value of the grand coalition, (2) Symmetry, that any two
agents with symmetric contributions to the group, will receive
equal individual shares, (3) Dummy Player, that is to give to agents
who do not contribute to the group, the value that they can gain
individually, and (4) Additivity that is, for two different cooperative
games, the value distribution be such that for each individual, the
summation of what she receives in each game be equal to her share
in the aggregated game. We first elaborate on how these properties
relate to responsibility reasoning though an example and then
present the general results.
Example 4.2 (Distributing Responsibility Among Many Hands).
We can formulate the responsibility game for our running example
in which ϱ(Γ) = 1 for any agent group Γ that is either responsible
or is a superset of a responsible group—i.e., NS , ES ,WS , NEW , and
their supersets. Then for agents N , E,W , and S , we have that the
responsibility value is respectively equal to: 2⇑12, 2⇑12, 2⇑12, and
6⇑12. Observe that: (1) agents that possess more power (i.e., have
more poison) have a larger responsibility value—with more power
comes more responsibility, (2) the responsibility values of agents
with symmetric power, i.e., E andW , are equal (Symmetry), and (3)
the responsibility values of all agents sum up to 1 (Efficiency).
Observations (2) and (3) in Example 4.2 above (Symmetry and
Efficiency) hold in general due to properties of the Shapley alloca-
tion.
Proposition 4.3 (Fairness Properties). Letℳ be a CEGS, 𝒮 a
state of affairs, and λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ an arbitrary q-history. If R𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ ≠ ∅,
we have:
(1) ∑
a∈Σ ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = 1 (Efficiency);
(2) fora1,a2 ∈ Σ, ρa1,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = ρa2,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ if for all Γ ⊆ Σ∖{a1,a2}
we have that ϱ(Γ ∪ {a1}) = ϱ(Γ ∪ {a2}) (Symmetry);
(3) for a ∈ Σ, ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = 0 if for all Γ ⊆ Σ ∖ {a} we have that
ϱ(Γ ∪ {a}) = ϱ(Γ) (Dummy player).
Proof. All three properties directly follow from the properties
of the Shapley value [22]. □
Next, we show that considering two distinguishable state of
affairs, the responsibility value of any agent for the union of the
two is equal to the summation of its responsibility values for each.
Proposition 4.4. [Conditional Additivity] Letℳ be a CEGS, 𝒮
and 𝒮′ two states of affairs such that 𝒮 ∖ 𝒮′ ≠ ∅ and 𝒮′ ∖ 𝒮 ≠ ∅,
λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ an arbitrary q-history, and a ∈ Σ. If R𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, R𝒮′q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ ≠∅, then we have that ρa,𝒮∪𝒮′q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀+ρa,𝒮′q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ (Additivity).
Proof. (sketch) the two state of affairs 𝒮 and 𝒮′ correspond to
two responsibility games. Then, relying on the additivity of the
Shapley value, we have the additivity of our Shapley-based notion
of responsibility value. Note that as a result of the non-emptiness
of both R𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ and R𝒮′q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, we have that q ∈ 𝒮 ∩ 𝒮′. □
This property relates to ascribing responsibility for properties
that are explainable in a disjunctive form. For instance, imagine a
case where the reasoner is concerned with both a murder (repre-
sented by the truth of the propositionm) and a robbery (represented
by the truth of the proposition r ). Then we can label the set of states
in which the murder took place with 𝒮 and the set of states in which
the robbery occurs with 𝒮′. Then, according to our results, we have
that the responsibility value for an agent a form ∨ r is equal to the
summation of her responsibilities for each. In the next section, we
explain how our CEGS-based semantics can be linked to reasoning
about the truth of propositions to allow systematic responsibility
verification in multiagent systems.
Next, we have that if a singleton group Γ is the uniqueq-responsible
group for 𝒮 , then such a “polarizing dictator” is the only agent with
responsibility value equal to 1 while other agents receive 0.
Proposition 4.5 (Uniqely Responsible). Letℳ be a CEGS, 𝒮
a state of affairs, q ∈ 𝒮 a state, and λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ an arbitrary q-history.{a ∈ Σ} is the unique q-responsible (singleton group) for 𝒮 based on a
q-history λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ iff ρa,𝒮q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = 1 and for all a′ ∈ Σ ∖ {a}, we have
ρa
′,𝒮
q,λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ = 0.
Proof. (sketch) except a, marginal contribution of all agents to
any subgroup is zero while a’s contribution to any group is equal
to 1. □
5 VERIFYING RESPONSIBILITY
In this section we give a logical characterization for our notion of
backward responsibility. We use a variant of Alternating Time Tem-
poral Logic (ATL) [3] proposed in [17] that adds indistinguishably
relations to explicitly specify the epistemic uncertainty of agents
and hence allows reasoning about group responsibility under im-
perfect information.7
5.1 Preliminaries: ATLir
The language of ATL is built from the following components: Σ ={a1, . . . ,an} a set of n agents and Π a set of propositions. Formulas
of the language ℒATL are defined by the following syntax, φ,ψ ∶∶=
p ⋃︀ ¬φ ⋃︀ φ ∧ψ ⋃︀ ⎷Γ⌄◯φ ⋃︀ ⎷Γ⌄φ𝒰ψ ⋃︀ ⎷A⌄ ◻ φ
where p ∈ Π is a proposition, and Γ ⊆ Σ is a typical group of agents.
We consider the semantics of ATL under imperfect informa-
tion and with memoryless strategies, which is usually denoted by
ATLir [9] (i for imperfect information, r for memoryless rather
than perfect recall strategies). Recall the notions of CEGS and uni-
form memoryless strategies given in Section 2.2. We extend CEGS
with a propositional labeling function π ∶ Π → 2Q .
7To reason about backward responsibility with respect to a history, we could use
ATL extended with linear past (ATLlp ) [14]. However ATLlp does not allow mod-
eling imperfect information settings and the model checking problem for ATLlp is
EXPTIME-complete, see [6] and our Theorem 5.1.
Informally, ⎷Γ⌄◯φ means that Γ has a collective strategy to
ensure that the next state satisfies φ; ⎷Γ⌄φ𝒰ψ means that Γ has a
collective strategy to ensure ψ while maintaining the truth of φ;
and ⎷Γ⌄ ◻ φ means that Γ has a collective strategy to ensure that
φ is always true. The semantics of ATLir is defined relative to a
CEGSℳ and state q and is given below:● ℳ,q ⊧ p iff q ∈ π(p)● boolean cases are standard● ℳ,q ⊧ ⎷Γ⌄◯φ iff exists a strategy ZΓ such that for all
computations λ ∈ out(q,ZΓ),ℳ,λ(︀1⌋︀ ⊧ φ● ℳ,q ⊧ ⎷Γ⌄φ𝒰ψ iff exists a strategy ZΓ such that for all
computations λ ∈ out(q,ZΓ), for some i ,ℳ,λ(︀i⌋︀ ⊧ ψ , and
for all j < i ,ℳ,λ(︀j⌋︀ ⊧ φ● ℳ,q ⊧ ⎷Γ⌄ ◻ φ iff exists a strategy ZΓ such that for all
computations λ ∈ out(q,ZΓ), for all i ,ℳ,λ(︀i⌋︀ ⊧ φ.
5.2 Logical Characterization of Responsibility
We first provide a translation of our notion of state of affairs as a
subset of Q in terms of a logically verifiable proposition. Given a
formula φ, we denote by ⟦φ⟧ℳ the set of states in which φ holds.
Then instead of writing “Γ is responsible for 𝒮 = ⟦φ⟧ℳ” , we simply
say “Γ is responsible for φ". Note that all the states in which φ holds
corresponds to a fixed set of states 𝒮 ⊆ Q . In the following we show
that our notions of responsibility can be formalized within ATL.8
Γ is responsible for φ given the q-history λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ iff:
(1) ℳ,q ⊧ φ (relevance of the history) and
(2) there exists a q′ ∈ λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀, s.t.ℳ,q′ ⊧ ⎷Γ⌄ ◻ ¬φ and for
all Γ′ ⊂ Γ,ℳ,q′ ⊭ ⎷Γ′⌄ ◻ ¬φ (minimality and preclusive
power).
The following theorem establishes the complexity of verifying
responsibility under imperfect information in a multiagent system.
Theorem 5.1 (Complexity). Let ℳ be a CEGS, q a state inℳ, λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ a q-history, and φ a formula of ATLir . The problem
of checking whether a group Γ is responsible for φ given λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ is
∆P2 -complete w.r.t. the size ofℳ and φ, and the length of λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀.
Proof. Weuse the fact thatmodel checkingATLir is∆P2 -complete
[18, 28].
Upper bound: It suffices to check that (1) ℳ,q ⊧ φ, and
(2) there is q′ ∈ λ(︀qi ,k⌋︀ such thatℳ,q′ ⊧ ⎷Γ⌄ ◻ ¬φ andℳ,q ⊧¬⎷Γ ∖ {a}⌄◻¬φ for every agent a ∈ Γ. This requires 1+k(1+ ⋃︀Γ⋃︀)
calls to ATLir model checking, which yields a procedure in ∆P2 .
Lower bound: Take the reduction of SNSAT2 in [18]. There, for
every SNSAT2 instance Θ with r assignments, one constructs a
CEGSℳr and an ATLir formula Φr such that Θ returns true iffℳr ,qr0 ⊧ Φr .9 We extend the reduction as follows.
First, we construct modelℳ′r by adding a new agent i and an
extra state q′0 with two outgoing transitions fully controlled by i:
one looping at q′0, and the other proceeding to qr0 . The new agent
does not influence any transition in the rest ofℳ′r . Moreover, no
atomic proposition holds in the new state (in particular, propositions
yes and neg do not hold there). Secondly, we observe thatℳ′r ,q′0 ⇑⊧
Φr , since the system can loop in q′0, and never reach either yes or
8We misuse notation and say “q ∈ λ" to refer to a state q that occurs in a history λ.
9 Due to lack of space, wemust refer the reader to [18] for the details of the construction.
neg. Thus, we also have that ℳ′r ,q′0 ⊧ ⎷i⌄ ◻ ¬Φr . Thirdly, the
only proper subset of {i} is the empty coalition ∅, and we have
thatℳ′r ,q′0 ⊧ ⎷∅⌄ ◻ ¬Φr iffℳ′r ,qr0 ⇑⊧ Φr . Hence, alsoℳ′r ,q′0 ⊧¬⎷∅⌄◻¬Φr iffℳ′r ,qr0 ⊧ Φr . Now, take the history h = (q′0,qr0) inℳ, and consider the responsibility of coalition {i} for Φr based on
h. Both conditions are now equivalent to checking ifℳ′r ,qr0 ⊧ Φr .
Thus,ℳr ,qr0 ⊧ Φr iff {i} is responsible for Φr based on h, which
completes the reduction. □
6 DISCUSSION
Following Chockler and Halpern [10] who argue that: “We cannot
say that a definition is right or wrong, but we can and should ex-
amine how useful a definition is, particularly the extent to which it
captures our intuitions”, we focus on three well-known examples
in the literature on responsibility, identify responsible agents and
agent groups, show how our approach allows the ascription of (a
degree of) responsibility to agents, and how the strategic, temporal,
normative, and epistemic aspects that plat a role can be captured.
6.1 Responsibility and Blameworthiness
The Traveller and Two Enemies. This scenario (adapted from
[24]) is about a traveller P who requires water to survive a trip
across the desert. P has two enemies E1 and E2. The night before
P ’s departure, E1 adds poison to the water in P ’s canteen. Later,
but before P departs, E2 empties the (poisoned) water from the
canteen. P dies of thirst in the middle of the desert. The question
is: who is responsible for P ’s death? Given the history above, from
our definition of responsibility, we have that neither E1 nor E2 are
individually responsible for the death (see Figure 2 for the game
structure).
q0
start
q1 q2
q3
p
q4 ¬p q6 ¬pq5 ¬p
E2
E1 E1 E1
¬poiso
n poison
¬empt
y em
pty ¬emp
ty empty
Figure 2: In q0, E1 may poison the water or not. In q1 and q2,
E2 can either empty the canteen or not. As a result, P is alive
in q3 (represented by proposition p) and dead in q4, q5, and
q6 (represented by ¬p). The path outlined in blue denotes the
history.
Given the history q0,q2,q6, E2’s emptying of the canteen had no
influence on P ’s death (and hence E2 has no strategy to avoid it).
On the other hand, E1 could act differently in q0 by not poisoning
the water in P ’s canteen. However, by not poisoning the water, E1
cannot ensure that P will not die (as E2’s may empty the canteen).
E1,E2 is therefore the minimal group that has a uniform strategy
to avoid the death of P , and due to their symmetric contributions,
both E1 and E2 are 1⇑2 responsible for the death.
In causal models (e.g. in [10, 15]), responsibility is modeled as a
derived notion (basically as a degree of causality). In causality-based
responsibility modeling, the direct cause of P dying of thirst is the
empty canteen, which was the work of E2. Hence, E2 is causally
responsible for P ’s death. (Note that the notion of responsibility in
[10] applies to events rather than agents; this can be extended to
agents as in [2].) E1’s degree of causal responsibility for P ’s death
is 0 (E1 is not part of the cause), and E2’s is 1. The notion of blame
in [10] is closer to our notion of responsibility, since it involves an
epistemic component and applies to agents. An agent may not know
properties of the current state, the effects of actions, and causal
relationships in general. In some of the epistemic alternatives the
agent considers possible, the agent’s actions have some degree of
responsibility for the current outcome, in some not. The agent has
a probability distribution over the alternatives. The agent’s degree
of blame is the expected value of the degree of responsibility. For
example, if E1 assigns probability 0 to the actual state of affairs
(where P dies of thirst rather than of poison, and E1’s degree of
responsibility is 0), and probability 1 to the state of affairs where
P has died because of drinking poisoned water, where E1’s degree
of responsibility for the death is 1, then E1’s degree of blame is
1. Chockler and Halpern [10] assign blame based on the agent’s
(possibly false) belief in having performed actions that caused the
outcome. In contrast, our approach assigns responsibility based on
having a uniform strategy to avoid the outcome. However, in both
approaches E1 can be assigned either a degree of responsibility or
a degree of blame.
6.2 Agency and Strategic Responsibility
One of the widely discussed examples in the literature of respon-
sibility is due to Frankfurt [12], and concerns scenarios in which
agents perform actions that they did not intend to perform, e.g.,
under the influence of an implanted device in their brain, and
where an undesired situation results as a consequence (see [34] for
various versions of this example). For example, while under the
influence/side-effects of medication agent A shoots agent B. If B
dies as a result, is A responsible?
Our notion builds on agents’ abilities and accounts for their
preclusive power. In principle, it requires that the responsible agent
should have an effective agency to influence the situation through
a strategy to avoid the outcome. Hence, in Frankfurt’s scenario and
following our notion,A is not strategically responsible for the death
of B—asA has no strategy to avoid the shooting B due to the effects
of medications. This result corresponds with the perspective that
sees agency as a crucial requirement for for ascribing responsibility,
e.g., see [7]. Relating to the causality-based notion of Chockler and
Halpern [10], the agent who performed the action that caused the
death, i.e., A, is causally responsible. However, depending on A’s
probability distribution over effects of actions etc., A may not be to
blame for the murder. Here we see that—as explained earlier—our
notion of responsibility is close to what [10] defines as degree of
blameworthiness.
6.3 Responsibility as Ability to Prevent vs
Ability to Cause
In this scenario (taken from [10]), Billy and Suzy each throw a rock
(accurately) at a bottle. Suzy throws harder, and her rock hits the
bottle first so that the bottle shatters before Billy’s rock reaches
it. The question is: “who is responsible for the shattered bottle?” See
Figure 3 for the CGS representation of this example.
Given the history q0,q4, the group bs is responsible for the shat-
tered bottle—as it is a minimal group able to avoid it in q0 by
enforcing q1 (in which ¬Sh holds). Accordingly, the responsibility
value of both Suzy (s) and Billy (b) is 1⇑2 (as they have symmetric
contributions to the group). Seeing the symmetric set of available
actions and their potentials with respect to the bottle shattering, it
is intuitive to share the responsibility equally.
In [10], where causal responsibility is considered, this formal-
ization is referred to as a naive model. The actual cause of the
bottle shattering is Suzy’s rock hitting the bottle, because she threw
harder. So Suzy’s throw is the only cause, and it has degree of re-
sponsibility 1. If Suzy considers it equally possible that she threw
harder or that Billy threw harder, then her degree of blame for the
shattered bottle would be 1⇑2 (because she has degree of respon-
sibility 1 in the alternative where she threw harder, and degree of
responsibility 0 in the alternative where Billy threw harder). In Fig-
ure 3 we model a situation where there is no epistemic uncertainty
over action outcomes (both agents know that the result of them
both throwing a rock is Suzy hitting the bottle) but still Suzy does
not have a strategy to prevent the bottle shattering because if she
does not throw the rock but Billy does, the bottle still shatters. In
our approach, Suzy does not have degree of responsibility 1 even
under perfect knowledge of her ability to throw harder.
q0start
q1 ¬Sh, ¬hitb , ¬hits
q2 Sh, ¬hitb , hits
q3 Sh, hitb , ¬hits
q4 Sh, ¬hitb , hits
∐︀¬t b,¬ts̃︀∐︀¬tb, ts̃︀∐︀tb ,¬ts ̃︀∐︀tb , ts ̃︀
Figure 3: In q0, Billy (b) and Suzy (s) may each throw a rock at
a bottle. We denote the act of throwing by ti for i ∈ {b, s}. In
states q1,q2,q3,q4, the proposition Sh denotes that the bottle
is shattered, and hiti denotes that i’s stone hit the bottle. The
path outlined in blue denotes the history.
7 RELATEDWORK
Responsibility is a multidimensional concept that has been ana-
lyzed, modeled, and studied in different disciplines and from various
perspectives, including causal responsibility [2, 10, 15], power-based
responsibility [8, 35, 36], and influence responsibility (defined as an
agent’s ability to cause (indirect) harm or violation of social norms
through other agents [21]). Moreover, responsibility can be seen as
relating to a situation that has already occurred (backward-looking
responsibility), or to whether a group of agents can bring about a
particular situation (forward-looking responsibility) [30]. Below, we
briefly compare our approach to related work in artificial intelli-
gence, philosophy, and multiagent systems literature, and highlight
the aspects of responsibility we aim to capture.
Our approach to modeling backward-looking responsibility in
terms of strategic ability to influence the occurrence of a situa-
tion in a given history, is related to some approaches in modeling
forward-looking coalitional responsibility, e.g., [8, 35, 36], based on
the notion of preclusive power [25]. In comparison to [8, 35] where
strategic ability is limited to single-step strategies, our view of
strategic ability is more general. Moreover, they assume perfect in-
formation, while we relax this assumption and model responsibility
under imperfect information. In [36], so called distant responsibility
is modeled using multi-step strategies, however they again concep-
tualize the responsibility of agents assuming perfect information.
Another strand of related work is [21], which aims to capture the
“indirect” responsibility of agents for influencing the (undesired)
choices of other agents. They focus on modeling the responsibility
of individual agents and abstract from epistemic aspect of agents’
ability to influence others. As they model the notion of influence
in agent systems, their work can be seen as a basis for modeling
coalitional responsibility in semi-autonomous settings—i.e., where
agents are not fully autonomous in choosing among their legal
actions and can be influenced by others. In contrast, in our approach,
we focus on strategic ability of groups of agents to preclude the
occurrence of a situation, and abstract from agents’ interactions or
communicative potentials.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we proposed a notion for reasoning about responsibil-
ity in multiagent systems under imperfect information. We used the
semantic machinery of ATLir , which enables a systematic respon-
sibility verification process, and applied value allocation methods
from cooperative games, which resulted in the individual notion of
responsibility value. Based on our notion of responsibility value, one
can verify whether a group of agents is strategically responsible for
the occurrence of a situation. In (normative) legal systems—where
the legal text (e.g., the established criminal or civil law) assigns
a sanction value Sanc(S) to an undesirable situation S—one can
apply our responsibility notion to verify the “blameworthiness” of
any agent group A for S and then employ our distribution method
to determine how A’s members should collectively pay Sanc(S).
In future work, we plan to investigate the dynamics of respon-
sibility in richer settings, including: (1) in normative multiagent
organizations by taking into account the set of organizational obli-
gations and the nuances of verifying responsibility under (poten-
tially) conflicting obligations, and (2) under preferences, e.g., in
voting/election settings where responsibility for a social choice
can be formulated in terms of individual preferences. We are also
interested in studying the applicability of our responsibility notions
for reasoning about related concepts such as accountability [4, 13]
and the so called task-/role-responsibility [16, 30].
In this work, to verify responsibility, we reasoned from the stand
point of an “omniscient" judge who is external to the system and is
able to verify if a group is responsible based on her perfect knowl-
edge (of the system states and their evolution). We aim to extend
this by modeling a “non-omniscient” judge as a distinguished agent,
who is internal to the system and subject to epistemic uncertainty.
Specifying such a judge agent—and an indistinguishability relation
for her—models the situations in which the process of responsibility
verification (in addition to the execution of actions/strategies) may
take place under imperfect information. Such a non-omniscient
judge may reason in a cautious manner10 by seeing a group Γ re-
sponsible only if in all the possible histories (observable by the
judge), group Γ is responsible. We aim to also investigate credulous
reasoning about responsibility—by seeing a group Γ responsible
if under some (and not necessarily all) of the potential histories, Γ
is responsible—and then study the relations among all the three
modes of responsibility verification (i.e., from the point of view of
an omniscient, a credulous, and a cautious judge). Different notions
of responsibility may be applicable in different domains. For exam-
ple, a judge who is looking for a killer may ascribe responsibility
for death under cautious reasoning, whereas a physician who is
looking for responsible viruses (for a death) may opt to reason cred-
ulously and start sanctioning/treating viruses in a more extensive
manner (in comparison to the more narrow approach of a cautious
judge).
Finally, wewould like to extend our notion of responsibility value
such that it can capture the “difficulty” of strategies. To see this,
we highlight that in the current work, we see all the q-responsible
groups for 𝒮 , equally responsible for it. For instance, we do not
distinguish if the state (within the history) in which a group is able
to avoid 𝒮 is immediately before the current state q (near past)
or is multiple states far from q (far past). This is to assume that a
group that is able to avoid 𝒮 is responsible for it regardless of the
complexity of its available strategy. We aim to relax this assump-
tion in future work using the so called “hardness” of strategies in
[19] or the notion of responsibility distance in [36]. Then, we can
distribute responsibility among agents using a responsibility index
that considers the length/difficulty of available strategies.
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REFERENCES
[1] Thomas Ågotnes, Valentin Goranko, Wojciech Jamroga, and Michael Wooldridge.
2015. Knowledge and ability. In Handbook of Epistemic Logic, Hans van Dit-
marsch, Joseph Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi (Eds.). College
Publications, 543–589.
[2] Natasha Alechina, Joseph Y. Halpern, and Brian Logan. 2017. Causality, Re-
sponsibility and Blame in Team Plans. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on
Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2017, São Paulo, Brazil, May
8-12, 2017. ACM, 1091–1099.
[3] Rajeev Alur, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Orna Kupferman. 2002. Alternating-time
temporal logic. J. ACM 49, 5 (2002), 672–713. https://doi.org/10.1145/585265.
585270
[4] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Olivier Boissier, Katherine Marie May, Roberto
Micalizio, and Stefano Tedeschi. 2018. Accountability and Responsibility in Agent
Organizations. In International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent
Systems. Springer, 261–278.
[5] Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan. 2016. The social
dilemma of autonomous vehicles. Science 352, 6293 (2016), 1573–1576.
[6] Laura Bozzelli, Aniello Murano, and Loredana Sorrentino. 2018. Results on
alternating-time temporal logics with linear past. In 25th International Symposium
on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME 2018). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-
Zentrum fuer Informatik, 6:1–6:22.
[7] Matthew Braham andMartin Van Hees. 2012. An anatomy of moral responsibility.
Mind 121, 483 (2012), 601–634.
[8] Nils Bulling and Mehdi Dastani. 2013. Coalitional Responsibility in Strategic
Settings. In Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems - 14th International Work-
shop, CLIMA XIV, Corunna, Spain, September 16-18, 2013. Proceedings. Springer,
172–189.
[9] N. Bulling and W. Jamroga. 2014. Comparing Variants of Strategic Ability: How
Uncertainty and Memory Influence General Properties of Games. Journal of
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 28, 3 (2014), 474–518.
[10] Hana Chockler and Joseph Y Halpern. 2004. Responsibility and blame: A
structural-model approach. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 22 (2004),
93–115.
[11] Virginia Dignum. 2017. Responsible Autonomy. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017, Melbourne,
Australia, August 19-25, 2017. ijcai.org, 4698–4704.
[12] Harry G Frankfurt. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The
journal of philosophy 66, 23 (1969), 829–839.
[13] Davide Grossi, LambèrM.M. Royakkers, and Frank Dignum. 2007. Organizational
structure and responsibility. Artif. Intell. Law 15, 3 (2007), 223–249.
[14] Dimitar P Guelev, Catalin Dima, and Constantin Enea. 2011. An alternating-
time temporal logic with knowledge, perfect recall and past: axiomatisation and
model-checking. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21, 1 (2011), 93–131.
[15] Joseph Y. Halpern. 2016. Actual Causality. The MIT Press.
[16] Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. 2008. Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the
philosophy of law. Oxford University Press.
[17] Wojciech Jamroga. 2003. Some remarks on alternating temporal epistemic logic. In
Proceedings of formal approaches to multi-agent systems (FAMAS 2003). University
of Warsaw, 133–140.
[18] Wojciech Jamroga and Jürgen Dix. 2006. Model checking abilities under incom-
plete information is indeed ∆P2 -complete. EUMAS 6 (2006), 14–15.
[19] Wojciech Jamroga, Vadim Malvone, and Aniello Murano. 2017. Reasoning about
Natural Strategic Ability. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2017, São Paulo, Brazil, May 8-12, 2017.
ACM, 714–722.
[20] Tiago De Lima, Lambèr M. M. Royakkers, and Frank Dignum. 2010. Modeling the
problem of many hands in organisations. In ECAI 2010 - 19th European Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Lisbon, Portugal, August 16-20, 2010, Proceedings. IOS
Press, 79–84.
[21] Emiliano Lorini and Giovanni Sartor. 2015. Influence and Responsibility: A
Logical Analysis. In Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2015: The
Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference, Braga, Portual, December 10-11, 2015. IOS Press,
51–60.
[22] Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Dennis Whinston, Jerry R Green, et al. 1995. Mi-
croeconomic theory. Vol. 1. Oxford university press New York.
[23] Andreas Matthias. 2004. The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for
the actions of learning automata. Ethics and information technology 6, 3 (2004),
175–183.
[24] James Angell McLaughlin. 1925. Proximate cause. Harvard law review 39, 2
(1925), 149–199.
[25] Nicholas R Miller. 1981. Power in game forms. In Power, voting, and voting power.
Springer, 33–51.
[26] Gillman Payette. 2017. Ramifications of Imposing Uniform Responsibility on
Collective Action. Logique et Analyse 61, 243 (2017), 237–268.
[27] Alvin E. Roth and Robert E. Verrecchia. 1979. The Shapley Value As Applied to
Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation. Journal of Accounting Research 17, 1 (1979),
295–303.
[28] Pierre-Yves Schobbens. 2004. Alternating-time logic with imperfect recall. Elec-
tronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 85, 2 (2004), 82–93.
[29] Lloyd S Shapley. 1953. A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory
of Games 2, 28 (1953), 307–317.
[30] Ibo Van de Poel. 2011. The relation between forward-looking and backward-
looking responsibility. In Moral responsibility. Springer, 37–52.
[31] Ibo Van de Poel, Lambèr Royakkers, and Sjoerd D Zwart. 2015.Moral responsibility
and the problem of many hands. Routledge.
[32] Nicole A Vincent, Ibo Van de Poel, and Jeroen Van Den Hoven. 2011. Moral
responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Vol. 27. Springer.
[33] GerardAWVreeswik andHenry Prakken. 2000. Credulous and sceptical argument
games for preferred semantics. In European Workshop on Logics in Artificial
Intelligence. Springer, 239–253.
[34] David Widerker. 2000. Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibili-
ties: A further look. Noûs 34 (2000), 181–201.
[35] Vahid Yazdanpanah and Mehdi Dastani. 2015. Quantified Degrees of Group
Responsibility. In Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent
Systems XI - COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey,
May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected
Papers. Springer, 418–436.
[36] Vahid Yazdanpanah and Mehdi Dastani. 2016. Distant Group Responsibility in
Multi-agent Systems. In PRIMA 2016: Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
- 19th International Conference, Phuket, Thailand, August 22-26, 2016, Proceedings.
Springer, 261–278.
